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Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term 
projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political 
information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information 
market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts 
stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have 
the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during 
campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, 
we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss 
possible pitfalls of the mechanism. 
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Motivation
Indemocracieselectionsaretheprimarymechanismsformakingpoliticiansaccount-
able. Holding reelections may induce incumbents to act in the public interest and enable
the electorate to replace them with more promising candidates. However, at a particular
election date citizens may sometimes lack the information required to decide wisely about
whether an incumbent deserves to be re-elected. There may be various reasons for this
lack of information. Voters may be rationally ignorant, since in a large electorate the like-
lihood of a single citizen affecting the outcome of an election is negligible. Alternatively,
voters may have no access to information, e.g. in cases where policies have mainly long-
term effects and precise information about the consequences of a project is not available
at the election date.
A typical example of a long-term policy is unemployment.1 Reforming the labor
market is generally considered inevitable for remedying unemployment. However, intro-
ducing labor market reforms may initially cause disruptions and even higher unemploy-
ment, because some layoffs will occur immediately, while the creation of new jobs may
take time. Thus in the short term it may be impossible for voters to judge the politi-
cian’s performance in the ﬁeld of labor market policy. A policy problem with a longer
time horizon is also global warming. Due to the complex structure of the global warming
problem it is difﬁcult to assess how reducing greenhouse gases will affect the climate and
the well-being of people in the future.2
Triple Mechanism
In this paper we suggest a triple mechanism involving political information markets,
threshold incentive contracts, and democratic elections to solve this fundamental infor-
mation problem. At the end of the ﬁrst term, a political information market is held. Here
investors can bet on whether the incumbent will be reelected at the end of the second
1A detailed description of unemployment in Europe can be found in Saint-Paul (2000), for instance.
2Most predictions suggest that the temperature associated with thermal equilibrium on earth will in-
crease as a result of rapidly rising emissions of greenhouse gases (IPPC (2007)). Such temperature changes
may have a sizable impact on the well-being of future generations (see e.g. Cline (1992), Fankhauser
(1995), Nordhaus (2006), and Stern (2006)).term and hence whether he has undertaken socially beneﬁcial long-term policies. As it
is uncertain whether the politician will be reelected for the ﬁrst time at the end of period
1, this is a conditional information market. It aggregates the information on whether the
incumbent has undertaken socially desirable long-term projects or whether the incumbent
has merely pandered to current public opinion. A high price on the political information
market indicates high probability that the incumbent will be elected a second time.
The second element of the triple mechanism involves reelection threshold contracts
that competing politicians can offer before they start on their ﬁrst term. The reelection
threshold contract stipulates a critical price threshold the information market must reach
or exceed for the incumbent to have the right to stand for ﬁrst reelection. The critical
price thresholds are offered competitively by politicians campaigning for their ﬁrst term
in ofﬁce.
The third element of our mechanism are democratic elections that take place at three
dates. In a ﬁrst election, an ofﬁce holder with a particular reelection threshold contract is
elected by citizens. If the ofﬁce holder fulﬁlls his contract, he can stand for reelection at
the second date. If he succeeds, he can try to get reelected a second time.
The main idea of our paper is as follows: Political information markets, price thresh-
olds on these markets, and democratic elections increase the motivation of politicians to
undertake long-term beneﬁcial policies that may be unpopular at the time they are intro-
duced. We develop this insight in the framework of a simple political agency model. We
show that a carefully designed combination of political information markets and threshold
contracts can – on balance – improve welfare. In section 5 we explore the robustness of
the triple mechanism and we address several potential pitfalls such as attempts to manip-
ulate information markets.
The Literature
Our model is most closely related to the suggestion to combine contracts and demo-
cratic elections introduced by Gersbach (2003) and extended by Gersbach (2006) and
Gersbach and Liessem (2008). These papers show how the dual mechanism – contracts
offered competitively during campaigns and elections – can improve political outcomes.
All these papers rely on veriﬁable data by which contracts can be conditioned. As a con-
3trast, we also analyze the case where the results from current policy can only be observed
in a future period and may never be veriﬁable. We suggest a novel triple mechanism
where a political information market produces veriﬁable information in the form of prices
at a time when policy results are not observable.
Political information markets have attracted a lot of attention recently. Information
markets have been suggested to improve public policy decisions. (See e.g. the recent sur-
veys and discussions by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), or Hanson (2003), who suggests to
use information markets to select policies that are expected to raise GDP.) A comprehen-
sive summary on this relatively new topic can be found, for example, in Hahn and Tetlock
(2004). The basic idea behind information markets is the accumulation of scattered in-
formation in order to predict uncertain future events. Political information markets have
turned out to be quite successful in predicting election results (see e.g. Berg, Forsythe and
Rietz (1996) or Berlemann and Schmidt (2001)) and are already established in practice.
We suggest a new type of information market. While standard markets predict the result
of the next election, we use a market that predicts the result of the next but one election
in order to obtain an approximation of the long-term effects of current policies. The idea
is that the incumbent will only be reelected in the next but one election if the voters are
satisﬁed with the long-term project results they learn about over time.
The information our prediction market aggregates could, in principle, also be pro-
vided by other sources, in particular by a free press. The information market has the
advantage that it generates a veriﬁable signal in the form of a price on which reelection
threshold contracts can be conditioned. This is not the case for information provision by
the media, even if such provision were unbiased.
Our paper is broadly related to political agency and accountability theory. While this
literature developed by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), and Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997) has established the advantages and drawbacks of democratic elections in making
ofﬁce-holders accountable, we present a new institutional framework to address the ac-
countability of politicians. We would like to point out that our analysis is a theoretical
exercise on how such a new institutional framework would function and how it might
improve – on balance – existing electoral processes.
4Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce the model. The
results for elections only are analyzed in section 3. In section 4 we examine the triple
mechanism involving political information markets, threshold incentive contracts, and
democratic elections. In section 5 we look at some extensions to our basic model. Section
6 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs. Appendices B and C describe the political
information market in more detail. In Appendix D we provide a numerical example.
2 The Basic Model
Our basic model draws on Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Gersbach and Liessem (2008).
There are three periods, denoted by t = 1;2;3.
2.1 The Election Framework
There is a continuum of identical voters of measure 1. We assume that there are two
politicians denoted by i = 1;2. They compete for ofﬁce before the ﬁrst period starts. The
elected politician has to take some kind of action during the ﬁrst period. He can choose
between action a1 = 1 and action a1 = 0. All voters have the same preference ranking
for the two possible actions,3 but they do not know their preferences when they decide
about the ofﬁce-holder for the ﬁrst term. There are two possible states of the world s1 = 1
and s1 = 0, which are drawn randomly. State s1 = 1 will occur with probability z, and
state s1 = 0 will occur with probability 1−z. We assume that 1
2 < z < 1. The state of
the world determines which action is optimal for the voters. If state s1 = 1 is drawn, then
the optimal action for the voters will be a1 = 1. The optimal action for the voters will be
a1 = 0 in state s1 = 0. If a1 = s1, voters get a payoff of 1, otherwise they get a payoff of
0. Voters are risk-neutral and want to maximize their expected utility. As z > 1
2, we will
refer to a1 = 1 as the popular action and to a1 = 0 as the unpopular action.
There are two types of politicians, either congruent or dissonant. Both politicians
know their own type and the type of their opponent.4 However, voters cannot observe the
3For the relevance of this assumption and for an outline of how to accommodate heterogeneous prefer-
ences of voters, see Maskin and Tirole (2004).
4The assumption that politicians have knowledge about each other’s type may appear to be plausible
5politicians’ types. A politician is congruent with a probability of 1
2. In this case he has
the same preferences as the voters. A politician is dissonant with a probability of 1
2, i.e.
if a1 = 1 is optimal for the voters, then a1 = 0 is optimal for the dissonant politician and
vice versa. The two political candidates may differ as to congruence or dissonance. In all
other respects they are identical.
2.2 The Information Structure
At the beginning of the whole game, voters and politicians have a priori probabilities of z
that state s1 = 1 will occur and of 1−z that state s1 = 0 will occur. In the ﬁrst period, the
elected politician can learn precisely which state of the world has occurred, thus knowing
with certainty which action is best for the voters and which action is best for himself.
We assume that voters are able to observe the action of the incumbent immediately
and that the action is veriﬁable.5 We also assume that, while it is impossible to verify
which state of the world has occurred, the voters will be able to observe it. However, it
is not clear when the voters will make this observation. We assume that before their ﬁrst
reelection decision voters will observe with probability µ which state of the world has
realized, while the probability that they will observe the state in period 2 (i.e. after their
ﬁrst reelection decision) is 1−µ. Further, we assume that 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1
2 to analyze a situation
where the possibility that the performance of a project is not observable in the short term
is a serious problem.6 Note that regardless of whether there is early observability or not,
the project result will never be veriﬁable. Thus, the problem of non-veriﬁability is given
in all cases.
We assume that the value of µ does not depend on the realized state of the world. This
means that early observability is as likely in state s1 = 1 as in state s1 = 0. The incumbent
has to undertake the action in the ﬁrst period before he knows whether the voters will be
able to observe the realized state in period 1.
Some remarks about our informational assumptions are in order here. We model a
because of their daily interaction. However, a candidate cannot use his knowledge about the type of his
opponent in his election campaign, since he is not able to credibly communicate this information.
5Veriﬁcation means that it can be proved in a court of law.
6The assumption that µ ≤ 1
2 is not crucial for our qualitative results. It is only of importance for our
quantitative welfare analysis in Appendix D.
6situation where politicians obtain information earlier than voters. At the time the policy
is undertaken, the incumbent can precisely identify the correct state of the world, while
voters are still completely ignorant. Voters will observe the state of the world at a later
point in time. If voters only observe the realized state in period 2, they do not know
whether the incumbent has undertaken the socially optimal action at the time of their ﬁrst
reelection decision.
2.3 Reelection Schemes
Voters are able to observe the realized state in period 1 with a probability of µ. In this
case they know whether the politician has undertaken the socially optimal action, and
we assume that they will reelect the incumbent if a1 = s1, while they will deselect him
if a1 ̸= s1.7 If voters are not able to observe the state of the world in period 1, which
happens with a probability of 1−µ, they do not know whether the incumbent has acted
congruently. Voters will reelect the politician if a1 = 1, while they will deselect him if
a1 = 0, as a1 = 1 is the action that is more likely to be correct.8 We use r1 to denote
reelection probability for the incumbent after his ﬁrst period in ofﬁce. When politicians
undertake their actions, their beliefs regarding reelection are given as
r1 =

   
   
µ+(1−µ) = 1 if a1 = 1, s1 = 1
0 if a1 = 0, s1 = 1
1−µ if a1 = 1, s1 = 0
µ if a1 = 0, s1 = 0
(1)
We assume that reelection probability at the end of period 2 depends only on the
outcomes realized in period 2 from the policy action undertaken in period 1. Further
policy actions during the second term are assumed to be irrelevant for reelection chances
at the end of period 2. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes our analysis and can be justiﬁed
in several ways. First, if the politician undertakes only long-term policies in the second
period, then no new information may be available at the end of the second period when
7Note that voters are indifferent between reelection schemes, as the politician will undertake no further
action during his second or third term in ofﬁce. The retrospective voting scheme used in this paper is an
optimal response of voters in our simple model and hence an equilibrium outcome. Retrospective voting
is a particular resolution of the indifference of voters creating the highest possible disciplining device. The
voting behavior can be further justiﬁed as a unique equilibrium outcome when we allow for an arbitrarily
small amount of reciprocity. This justiﬁcation has been developed by Hahn (2009). Of course, retrospective
voting is a polar case and thus highlights the trade-offs the politician faces.
8Again, retrospective voting is a best response of voters.
7the second reelection decision takes place. Second, the policy actions during his second
term in ofﬁce may be much less relevant than the ﬁrst-period choices, so the performance
of his policy depends only on his ﬁrst-period action. Later we will extend our model to
cover the case where the incumbent has to undertake further actions and discuss how this
inﬂuences our result.
We use r2 to denote the reelection probability for the incumbent at the end of period
2, and we assume that voters will reelect the incumbent if and only if he has acted con-
gruently. This means that both types of politician are deselected with certainty after the
second period at the latest if they behaved dissonantly in the ﬁrst period, while both types
of politicians are reelected with certainty at the end of the second period9 if they behaved
congruently in the ﬁrst period. Thus, the beliefs of the politicians regarding reelection at
the end of period 2 are given as:
r2 =
{
1 if a1 = 1 and s1 = 1 or if a1 = 0 and s1 = 0
0 if a1 = 1 and s1 = 0 or if a1 = 0 and s1 = 1
(2)
2.4 Preferences of Politicians
The elected politician has personal beneﬁts R from being in ofﬁce. Furthermore, he ob-
tains a private beneﬁt or personal satisfaction G if he undertakes the action that is optimal
for himself. This beneﬁt G accrues to the politician in the period in which he performs
the action.10 We assume that the candidate receives no utility from the realization of his
preferred action if another politician undertakes the action.11 We use δ with 0 < δ ≤ 1
to denote the discount factor for the politician. The utility of the politician in ofﬁce is
9Note that it is possible that a politician who behaved congruently in his ﬁrst term may be ousted from
ofﬁce by the voters when they make their ﬁrst reelection decision.
10It may be useful to think that the action is irreversible, e.g. investment in public infrastructure, such
that it cannot be overturned by a future ofﬁce holder.
11We might also assume that the politician receives the same utility as an ordinary voter if his opponent
performs the action. However, this assumption may be less plausible in the case of a dissonant politician.
At all events, the results of our analysis are not affected as long as the value of G is sufﬁciently large in
comparison to the utility of ordinary voters.
8denoted by UP and given by
UP = R+r1[δR+r2δ2R]+

   
   
G if a congruent politician acts congruently
G if a dissonant politician acts dissonantly
0 if a congruent politician acts dissonantly
0 if a dissonant politician acts congruently
(3)
where r1 is given by equation (1) and r2 is given by equation (2). Some examples will
illustrate the point. An elected politician who is congruent has utility R+(1−µ)δR if
he chooses a1 = 1 in state s1 = 0, while his utility is R+G+µ[δR+δ2R] if he chooses
a1 = 0 in state s1 = 0. A politician of the dissonant type has utility R+G+(1−µ)δR if
he chooses a1 = 1 in state s1 = 0, while his utility is R+[δR+δ2R] if he chooses a1 = 1
in state s1 = 1.
We now need to examine the circumstances under which the elected politician will
act congruently. Obviously, it is always optimal for the voters if the incumbent behaves
congruently. We will use the following tie-breaking rule: If the elected politician is indif-
ferent as to the two actions, he will undertake the action that is optimal for the voters.
2.5 Summary and Welfare Criterion
The timing of the whole game in its basic version is summarized in the following ﬁgure:
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9The welfare criterion we adopt is the expected utility of voters at the time when the
ﬁrst election starts. Maximization of voters’ utility is equivalent to the maximization of
the likelihood that the correct action is undertaken.12
3 Elections Only
In this section we consider the behavior of both types of politicians in the scenario without
threshold contracts and information markets. Here elections are the only instrument used
to discipline the incumbent.
3.1 Behavior of Dissonant Politicians
We ﬁrst look at case s1 = 1, where the popular action is optimal from the voters’ point of
view but the politician would prefer the unpopular action. The dissonant politician will
only undertake the socially optimal action if
R+δR+δ2R ≥ R+G
⇔ δR(1+δ) ≥ G: (4)
Condition (4) will be violated if the personal gain from choosing the individually optimal
action is sufﬁciently larger than the gains from holding ofﬁce.
We next examine s1 = 0. Here voters prefer the unpopular action while the politi-
cian prefers the popular action. The dissonant politician will only undertake the socially
optimal action if
R+µ(δR+δ2R) ≥ R+G+(1−µ)δR
⇔ δR(2µ+δµ−1) ≥ G: (5)
This condition can only be fulﬁlled for certain values of δ and µ, as (5) cannot be satisﬁed
if (2µ+δµ−1) is not positive. Note that (2µ+δµ−1) is monotonically increasing in δ.
For δ = 1 the condition (2µ+δµ−1) > 0 is equivalent to µ > 1
3. This means that, even
in the case of δ = 1 (which is the value of δ that makes the condition most likely to be
fulﬁlled), it is only possible to fulﬁll equation (5) for 1
3 < µ < 1
2. Hence, there are large
12As we have a continuum of voters, we neglect the utility of the politician in aggregate welfare.
10parameter ranges where a dissonant politician cannot be motivated to perform the socially
optimal action if the unpopular state has occurred. In particular, this will not be possible
if the probability of early observation by voters is small, as reﬂected in a low value for µ.
Further, it is obvious that condition (4) is easier to fulﬁll than condition (5).
Finally, we obtain the following intuitive results. If the parameters are such that
condition (4) is fulﬁlled while condition (5) is not fulﬁlled, then there will be a distortion
infavorofthepopularactiona1 =1. Ifneithercondition(4)norcondition(5)arefulﬁlled,
then there will be a distortion in favor of the unpopular action a1 = 0.13 It is useful to
summarize the key observations in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1
Dissonant politicians will not choose the socially optimal action
(i) if s1 = 1 and δR(1+δ) < G or
(ii) if s1 = 0 and δR(2µ+δµ−1) < G.
Three particularly interesting special cases of Proposition 1 are summarized in the
following Corollary:
Corollary 1
Suppose δ = 1. A dissonant politician will not choose the socially optimal action,
A) if s1 = 1 has occurred and G > 2R or
B) if s1 = 0 has occurred and G > 1
2R or
C) if s1 = 0 has occurred and µ < 1
3.
Note that δ = 1 is most favorable for the public. If a dissonant incumbent cannot be
motivated to act congruently in case δ = 1, then it will never be possible.
13Note that z > 1
2, so – under the assumption that neither (4) nor (5) are fulﬁlled – the probability that the
incumbent will undertake a1 =0 in a situation where he should perform a1 =1 is higher than the probability
for undertaking a1 = 1 instead of the socially optimal action a1 = 0.
113.2 Behavior of Congruent Politicians
The congruent politician will undertake the socially optimal action in state s1 = 1 if
R+G+δR+δ2R ≥ R: (6)
This condition is always fulﬁlled, which means that, in this state of the world, congruent
politicians always undertake the socially optimal action, as both voters and the politician
prefer the popular action.
We now look at case s1 = 0, meaning that voters and the politician prefer the unpop-
ular action. The congruent politician will only undertake the optimal action for the voters
if
R+G+µ(δR+δ2R) ≥ R+(1−µ)δR
⇔ G+δR(2µ+δµ−1) ≥ 0: (7)
In contrast to the case of s1 = 1, it may now be the case that even a congruent politician
will not undertake the socially optimal policy, although he too would prefer this policy,
since the socially optimal action is unpopular but the politician would like to be reelected.
This condition resembles equation (5), but now G is on the left-hand side because a con-
gruent politician receives personal beneﬁts G by acting congruently, while a dissonant
politician receives G by acting dissonantly. Hence, if condition (5) is fulﬁlled, then con-
dition (7) will also hold. Obviously, if it is possible to motivate a dissonant politician to
undertake the socially optimal action, then it is always possible to motivate a congruent
politician to undertake the socially optimal action. Clearly, the reverse is not true. Fur-
thermore, we have a distortion in favor of the popular action, given that it is possible for
a1 = 1 to be chosen too often, while the incumbent may not always carry out the unpopu-
lar action a1 = 0 when he should. We summarize the results in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2
A politician of the congruent type will not undertake the socially optimal action if s1 = 0
and G+δR(2µ+δµ−1) < 0.
124 The Triple Mechanism
We now introduce reelection threshold contracts and analyze their effect on the behavior
of politicians and on social welfare. We assume that there exists a political information
market that yields a price predicting the reelection chances of the incumbent in the second
reelection decision. Investors receive private signals about which state of the world has
occurred, and information is aggregated in the information market.
In Appendix B we provide a detailed microfoundation of how prices are formed in
this information market, and how the information market enters and affects the political
process. The basic result is that the equilibrium price p∗ in the information market will
be higher if the incumbent undertakes the socially optimal action, as choosing the optimal
action ensures his success in the second reelection decision. In Appendix B we prove the
following result:
Proposition 3 (short version)
If the signals of investors are sufﬁciently informative, then the equilibrium price on the
information market is larger than one-half if the incumbent undertakes the action that is
socially optimal, while it is smaller than one-half if the incumbent chooses the socially
undesirable action.
The detailed version of Proposition 3 and its proof can be found in Appendix B.
4.1 Reelection Thresholds
Before the ﬁrst period starts, politician i can offer conditional reelection threshold con-
tracts Ci(p1
i ;p0
i ) with 0 ≤ p1
i ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p0
i ≤ 1, which means that the incumbent will
only be allowed to stand for reelection after the ﬁrst period if the price p∗ on a political




i if a1 = 1
p0
i if a1 = 0;
where p1
i is the threshold price if the incumbent undertakes a1 = 1 and p0
i is the threshold
price if he chooses a1 = 0. As the action of the politician is observable and veriﬁable,
politicians can condition the threshold prices on the action, therefore p1
i and p0
i may
differ. Note that a contract with p1
i = p0
i = 0 is equivalent to offering no contract at all.
134.2 Reelection Schemes
Reelection schemes are given by equation (1) for the ﬁrst reelection and by equation (2)
for the second reelection.14 Recall from equation (1) that the scheme for the ﬁrst reelec-
tion is such that a politician will always be deselected if he acts dissonantly in state s1 =1.
Thus, threshold contracts will have no effect in state s1 = 1, as in this state the reelection
schemefromequation(1)effectivelydetersthepoliticianfromactingdissonantly. Adding
threshold contracts prohibiting a politician who has behaved dissonantly from running for
reelection will not change the results, as the politician would not be reelected anyway. By
contrast, threshold contracts will have a positive effect in state s1 = 0. As a consequence,
only the threshold price p1
i will impact on the behavior of the politician, as dissonant
behavior in state s1 = 0 means choosing a1 = 1 and thus p1
i applies.
4.3 Summary
The timing of the whole game including threshold contracts and political information
markets is summarized in the following ﬁgure:
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14If information markets are allowed and actually used, they might be taken into account by voters when
making reelection decisions. Such feedback effects will be discussed in our extensions.
144.4 Robust Election Scheme
We assume that both politicians have to decide simultaneously about offering conditional
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We call this voting scheme robust election scheme (RES). The idea behind it is the
following: Voters will elect a politician if and only if the threshold offers indicate that
the politician will choose the socially optimal action, i.e. if p ≥ 1
2.15 The precise values
of p do not matter. Under RES a politician is elected with certainty if he offers prices
for both actions that are equal to or above 1
2 if the other politician does not do the same.
If both candidates offer threshold values that are qualitatively similar with regard to the
comparison to 1
2, then both candidates will be elected with a probability of one-half. Later
we will show that the assumptions of the voters in equilibrium are correct regarding the
behavior of politicians. Accordingly, we call this an optimal voting scheme.
4.5 Equilibrium Notion
We are looking for perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game depicted in Figure 2 among
politicians and investors. Voters are not highly sophisticated players. They vote according
to RES, as described above, and to the reelection schemes given in equations (1) and (2).
Henceforth a Bayesian equilibrium will simply be called “equilibrium”. The entire game
is solved by assuming RES and the property that a price equal to or above 1
2 indicates that
the politician has chosen the optimal action, while a price below 1
2 indicates the opposite.
The optimality of RES will be shown later. The property of the prices in the information
market is established in Appendix B. There we show that sophisticated investors use their
private signals and their updated beliefs from the signalling subgame when politicians
15Recall that the equilibrium price on the information market will be larger than one-half if and only if
the incumbent undertakes the action that is socially optimal.
15choose their action to trade on the information market. The equilibrium price indicates
whether the ofﬁce-holder has chosen the socially desirable action.
4.6 Equilibria
In this subsection we examine equilibria that involve robust election schemes. It is im-
portant to note that, when threshold contracts are offered, politicians do not know which
state of the world will occur. We use the following plausible reﬁnement:
Minimal Price Offer (MPO)
If a candidate is indifferent between two sets of prices for p1
i and p0
i given the
contract choice of the other politician and RES, then he will choose the contract
with the minimal values for p1
i and p0
i in the corresponding sets.
A formal description of MPO is as follows: Suppose a politician is indifferent be-
tween Ci(p1
i ;p0
i ) and ˜ Ci( ˜ p1
i ; ˜ p0
i ). Then he will choose Ci(p1
i ;p0
i ) if pk
i ≤ ˜ pk
i ∀k ∈
{0;1} and ∃l ∈ {0;1} : pl
i < ˜ pl
i, but ˜ Ci( ˜ p1
i ; ˜ p0
i ) if pk
i ≥ ˜ pk
i ∀k ∈ {0;1} and ∃l ∈
{0;1} : pl
i > ˜ pl
i.
The reﬁnement can be justiﬁed by the fact that the likelihood of fulﬁlling a given
threshold is non-increasing in the value of the prices.16 Through the observation that the
utility of an elected politician weakly decreases in his price offers we obtain the following
Lemma:
Lemma 1
Under MPO and RES, equilibrium price offers satisfy pk
i ≤ 1
2 ∀k ∈ {0;1};i = 1;2.
















16MPO can be justiﬁed by arbitrarily small errors of investors. Suppose there is a possibility of such
errors by investors. Then, the probability of fulﬁlling a given threshold is strictly decreasing in prices.
Without MPO, other prices than 1
2 in threshold contracts can emerge in equilibrium in Proposition 4. The






As only the threshold price p1
i will impact on the behavior of the incumbent, we thus
obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 2
A) Cases (i) and (ii) induce the same behavior by an elected politician.
B) Cases (iii) and (iv) induce the same behavior by an elected politician.
In Appendix A we show
Proposition 4
Both politicians will offer threshold contracts Ci(p1
i = p0
i = 1
2) under election scheme
RES, irrespective of their own type and irrespective of the type of their opponent.
Given this result of Proposition 4, we next show that the voting behavior of the RES
is indeed optimal:
Proposition 5
The robust election scheme (RES) is optimal for voters.
The proof is given in Appendix A. The strength of RES is that voters do not need to
have speciﬁc information regarding the parameters of projects or the signals of investors
in the information market. They simply judge whether politicians are willing to compete
against a fair coin. The next Proposition is our main result.
Proposition 6
The conditions under which politicians in state s1 = 0 behave congruently with threshold
contracts are less strict, and dissonant behavior is less attractive, than without threshold
contracts. This holds for both types of politicians. In particular, with the triple mechanism
we obtain:
(i) A dissonant politician acts congruently in state s1 =1 if and only if δR(1+δ)≥G.
(ii) Adissonantpoliticianactscongruentlyinstates1 =0ifandonlyif δRµ(1+δ)≥G.
(iii) A congruent politician always behaves congruently in both states.
17The proof is given in Appendix A. The intuition is as follows: Given equilibrium
threshold contracts Ci(p1
i = 1
2), politicians have no chance of being reelected in state
s1 =0 if they behave dissonantly, i.e. if they undertake a1 =1. If they behave congruently,
their reelection chances are given by probability µ. If threshold contracts are absent, a
politician who behaves dissonantly still has a chance to get reelected, while congruent
behavior does not yield higher reelection probabilities than µ. Hence, threshold contracts
make dissonant behavior in state s1 = 0 less attractive than congruent behavior.
In Appendix D we provide a brief example of the welfare gains that can be achieved
with the triple mechanism. The example illustrates, among other things, that threshold
contracts have the largest effect on welfare when R is larger than G and when the proba-
bility of the unpopular state s1 = 0 is rather high (i.e. z close to 1
2).
5 Extensions, Robustness and Pitfalls
In the following we discuss several extensions of the model, thereby exploring the robust-
ness and potential pitfalls of the triple mechanism.
5.1 Monotonic Election Scheme and Overpromising
As we showed in Proposition 5 the robust election scheme used in the last section is
optimal for voters. However, it is not clear whether the scheme is unique. In this section
we consider further candidates for election schemes. We start with a simple and intuitive





















The MES is intuitive in the sense that voters simply elect the candidate who offers
tighter constraints on his reelection thresholds. The problem is, however, that overpromis-
ing may occur under MES. We call a threshold contract with prices p1;p0 overpromising
if at the date of the offer the politician already knows that at least one of the thresholds can
never be reached. Such overpromising may occur if it is more proﬁtable for a politician to
18be elected with certainty in the ﬁrst election and to be certainly not reelected in the next
election, in comparison to being elected with probability 1
2 in the ﬁrst election and having
a positive reelection probability. In Appendix A we show
Proposition 7
Under the monotonic election scheme, overpromising may occur.
Overpromising invites extreme short-termism, where both types of politicians simply
behave in accordance with their ﬁrst-period preferences and maximize their ﬁrst period
utility. In the case of overpromising, dissonant politicians will always behave dissonantly,
while a congruent politician will behave congruently.17 Hence, the monotonic election
scheme is not optimal and thus is not an equilibrium response by voters.
5.2 Sophisticated Election Scheme







      
      
1 if p1
1 ≥ z, p0
1 ≥ 1−z, and p1
2 < z or p0
2 < 1−z,
1 if p1
2 < z, p0
2 < 1−z, and p1
1 ≥ z or p0
1 ≥ 1−z,
0 if p1
1 < z, p0
1 < 1−z, and p1
2 ≥ z or p0
2 ≥ 1−z,
0 if p1
2 ≥ z, p0
2 ≥ 1−z, and p1





This voting scheme is similar to RES but the critical values are not 1
2 but z for action
a1 = 1 and 1−z for action a1 = 0. This reﬂects the fact that the a priori probability for
s1 = 1 (where a1 = 1 is socially optimal) is z and for s1 = 0 (where a1 = 0 is socially
optimal) is 1−z. With a sophisticated election scheme, voters demand that the prices
on the information market at least reach the a priori probabilities. In this voting scheme
voters use the following result:
17It is obvious that overpromising is socially detrimental in the case of dissonant politicians. If the in-
cumbent is congruent, there will be no immediate negative effect on social welfare. However, as a congruent
incumbent who overpromises will be replaced by a new politician who can either be congruent or disso-
nant, overpromising by congruent politicians would have negative effects on social welfare in an extended
version of the model, where the incumbent would undertake further action in periods 2 or 3.
19Proposition 8 (short version)
If the signals of investors in the information market are sufﬁciently informative, then the
following holds:
(i) If the incumbent undertakes a1 = 1, then the price on the information market will
be larger than z if s1 = 1 and smaller than z if s1 = 0.
(ii) If the incumbent chooses a1 = 0, then the price on the information market will
exceed 1−z if s1 = 0, while the price will be below 1−z if s1 = 1.
The detailed version of Proposition 8 and its proof can be found in Appendix B.
Furthermore, one can show that under SES both politicians will offer Ci(p1
i = z;p0
i =
1−z) and that SES is also optimal for voters. The proof follows the same lines as the
proof of Propositions 4 and 5 and is therefore omitted here. Note that, with a sophisticated
election scheme, voters anticipate that the market price will be higher under congruent
behavior of the politician in state s1 =1 than under congruent behavior of the politician in
state s1 = 0. While both RES and SES are optimal for voters, we will show in Corollary 2
of Appendix B that the conditions for Proposition 8 to hold are weaker than the conditions
required for Proposition 3 to hold.
5.3 Market-Based Voting
In our basic model we have assumed that the price on the information market has no
inﬂuence on reelection probability. Now we assume the other polar case, where voters
only use the price on the information market as a basis for their ﬁrst reelection decision. In
this case, threshold contracts are without effect (either positive or negative). The existence
of a political information market that predicts the reelection chances after the next term
is sufﬁcient to generate all efﬁciency gains when voters solely use information markets as
their forward-looking reelection scheme.18 The reason is that the price on the information
market is the best predictor regarding the quality of the decisions of the politician. Purely
market-based voting is a polar case. It is likely that actual voting will be between both
polar cases (no market-based voting and purely market-based voting). Then, reelection
threshold contracts will continue to have beneﬁcial welfare effects.
18The same would occur if there existed other means that perfectly aggregate the information of investors.
205.4 Repeated Action
Another potential extension is to examine repeated actions by the politician. Suppose that
the incumbent stays in ofﬁce as long as he gets reelected, that he undertakes an action at in
each period t in ofﬁce,19 and that the candidates are allowed to offer threshold contracts
before each election. In the precursor of this paper (Gersbach and M¨ uller (2006)), we
have shown that the results of the two-period case still hold when actions are repeated.
In particular, threshold contracts are always socially advantageous compared to elections
alone, since the probability of a politician behaving congruently is higher when threshold
contracts are used.
5.5 More Candidates
Our analysis can be extended to more than two candidates running for ofﬁce in the ﬁrst
election. The election probability of a candidate would decrease accordingly and would
amount to 1
n where n is the number of candidates. Equilibrium threshold contract offers
and behavior of ofﬁce holders, as well as the price behavior in the information market,
would remain the same.
5.6 Manipulations
A serious concern is manipulation. The incumbent might try to push the equilibrium price
above the price in his threshold contract via trading in such markets.20 The most obvious
way to prevent manipulation is to prohibit trading by politicians and to punish the use
of stooges. However, such prohibitions may be not sufﬁcient to prevent manipulations.
A robust possibility to ensure that the incumbent is not interested in manipulating the
market is to use an average price calculated over a longer time-span. One can use the
entire time span between the action of the incumbent and the end of the ﬁrst term to
operate the information market. An incumbent who wants to raise the average market
price above his threshold price via manipulation would be forced to manipulate the price
19We assume that the politician will undertake no action in the last two periods, which corresponds to our
assumption in the basic model where the politician does not take any action in the second and third periods.
20Rhode and Strumpf (2004) discuss several historical manipulations episodes and provide important
insights how these can be engineered.
21in the information market every day over several years, which would become very costly
over time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have suggested a triple mechanism for improving the functioning of
democracies when information is not observable or not veriﬁable. The results seem to be
quite robust for various extensions. Moreover, the idea of the triple mechanism could be
extended to multi-task settings, where the politician decides on many issues in his ﬁrst
term. As the threshold contract depends on the average long-term performance of the
politician, the standard problem may aggravate distortions in favor of tasks with better
observability.
Political information markets are an instrument for solving the problem of short-
term unobservability coupled with long-term non-veriﬁability. Hence threshold contracts
combined with information markets can be used successfully when projects have long-
term effects and information on project results is not available in the short term. Of
course, any suggestion of a new institution such as the one made in this paper has to be
subjected to further scrutiny.21 Such scrutiny will be undertaken in our future research
work.
21One might, for example, wonder how the triple mechanism could be introduced. The best way to
try to implement the triple mechanism is political competition. If one candidate proposes the idea, then
competing candidates are forced to offer the same in order to avoid losing votes, as the triple mechanism is
welfare-improving.
22A Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that voters use the robust election scheme RES. Both candidates decide simulta-
neously about their threshold contracts. We show that Ci(p1
i = p0
i = 1
2) for i = 1;2 is the
unique equilibrium of the politician’s contract choice, given that voters will use RES.
Step 1: Given that candidate g ∈ {1;2} offers Cg(p1
g = p0
g = 1
2), politician h ̸= g,
h ∈ {1;2} will not offer pk
h < 1
2 for any k ∈ {0;1}, since he would have no chance of
winning the election. Furthermore, he has no incentive to offer pk
h > 1









independently of his type. Hence, offeringCi(p1
i = p0
i = 1
2) ∀i ∈ {1;2} is an equilibrium.
In the next steps we show that it is unique.
Step 2: We know from Lemma 1 that pk
i ≤ 1
2 ∀k ∈ {0;1};i = 1;2, so we only have to
examine whether there may exist other equilibria with threshold offers below 1
2. Suppose
that candidate g offers a contract with pk
g ≤ 1
2∀k ∈ {0;1} and pk
g < 1
2 for at least one
k ∈ {0;1}. We distinguish three cases:



















2) and because offering p0
h = 1
2 does not reduce the reelection chances of h,
whether he behaves congruently or dissonantly.22














2) as – according to Lemma 2 – this induces the same behavior
and gives the same reelection chances, while increasing the election chances from 1
2 to 1.































We consider candidate 1 and assume ﬁrst that he is of the congruent type. If a
congruent politician offers a contract with p1
1 = p0
1 = 1
2 and gets elected, then he will





2 and gets elected,24 then his behavior in state s1 = 0 will depend on whether
22Recall that only threshold p1
i can affect the reelection chances of the incumbent.
23This is obvious in state s1 = 1. In state s1 = 0, the politician has utility R+G+µ[δR+δ2R] when he
behaves congruently and utility R when be behaves dissonantly. Hence, the politician will always behave
congruently. Closer reasoning will be given in Proposition 6.
24Note that in this case the election probability is only 1
2.













To analyze this inequality, we consider the two possible cases, starting with R+G+
µ[δR+δ2R] ≥ (R+(1−µ)δR). In this case, inequality (10) simpliﬁes to 1 ≥ 1
2 and thus






This condition is always fulﬁlled because 1
2z[R+δR] > 1
2(1−z)[R+(1−µ)δR] and the
other terms on the left hand side of the condition are positive. Thus, a congruent politician
1 will offer a contract with p1
1 = p0
1 = 1










2). In contrast to our considerations for congruent politicians above, it
is no longer clear this time whether politician 1 will behave congruently or dissonantly.




this claim we distinguish four cases:
(i) Suppose candidate 1 is elected and behaves in a dissonant manner regardless of the

































where EU1 denotes the expected utility of politician 1 depending on the contract he




(ii) Suppose candidate 1 is elected and behaves in a congruent manner, regardless of











25Intuitively, this will occur if the value of G is sufﬁciently large.


































2). According to equa-
tions (12) and (14) acting congruently after having offered p1
1 < 1
2 is only optimal if
G<[z+(1−z)µ](1+δ)δR. However, for G<[z+(1−z)µ](1+δ)δR the politician
would act congruently after having offered p1
1 = 1
2 according to equations (11) and
(13). This is a contradiction. Hence, case (iii) cannot occur.

















2). As we have assumed that the candidate be-
haves congruently under C1(p1
1 = p0
1 = 1
2) and thus achieves higher or equal utility









Hence, we can conclude that if politician 1 is of the dissonant type, he will always
offer a contract C1(p1
1 = p0
1 = 1






To sum up, Ci(p1
i = p0
i = 1
2) ∀i ∈ {1;2} is the unique equilibrium under the election
scheme RES.
Proof of Proposition 5




believe that voters will use RES. Now we show that RES is optimal for voters.
Proposition 3 in Appendix B shows that the equilibrium price on the information
market will be larger than 1
2 if the incumbent chooses the socially optimal action, while it
will be smaller than 1
2 if the incumbent chooses the socially undesirable action. So RES is
optimal, as it induces the socially optimal action. Speciﬁcally, under RES a politician (say
i=2) who offers a contract with a price smaller than 1
2 will never generate a higher utility
than a politician who offers thresholds p1
1 and p0
1 equal to 1
2. Thus in this case electing
politician 1 can never be worse than electing politician 2. Finally, we note that under RES
25a politician (say i = 2) who offers a contract with a threshold strictly larger than 1
2 will




2. In this case, electing politician 1 can never be worse than electing politician 2. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6
We start with dissonant politicians and look ﬁrst at the case s1 = 1 where the popular
action is optimal from the voters’ point of view. The politician, however, would prefer the
unpopular action. In the scenario with threshold contracts, the dissonant politician will
undertake the socially optimal action if and only if
R+δR+δ2R ≥ R+G
⇔ δR(1+δ) ≥ G: (15)
Comparison with the condition when threshold contracts are absent shows that condition
(15) is identical to condition (4). The reason is that threshold contracts have no impact in
state s1 = 1.
We next consider the case s1 = 0. In this state, voters prefer the unpopular action,
while the dissonant politician prefers the popular action. The dissonant politician will
only undertake the socially optimal action if
R+µ(δR+δ2R) ≥ R+G
⇔ δRµ(1+δ) ≥ G: (16)
Comparisonwiththeconditioninthescenariowithoutthresholdincentivecontractsshows
that condition (5) is tighter than condition (16), i.e. the set of parameter values fulﬁlling
(16) is larger than the corresponding set for condition (5). For instance, equation (16) is
always fulﬁlled if R is sufﬁciently high, which is not true in general under condition (5).
Next consider congruent politicians. In case s1 = 1, a congruent politician will un-
dertake the socially optimal action if
R+G+δR+δ2R ≥ R: (17)
This condition is always fulﬁlled. In case s1 = 0, a congruent politician will undertake
the optimal action if
R+G+µ(δR+δ2R) ≥ R: (18)
Again, this condition is always fulﬁlled. Hence, in both states of the world, the politician




2. As showed above in equation (7), this is not necessarily true for
congruent politicians in the scenario without threshold contracts.
26Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose that G is sufﬁciently large relative to R, such that congruent politicians will al-
ways act congruently and dissonant politicians will always act dissonantly, irrespective of
the threshold contracts they have offered. In Appendix B we show that, for G sufﬁciently
large relative to R, the equilibrium price will be smaller than 1, even if politicians act in
a socially optimal way. Thus, if both candidates offered contracts p1
i = p0
i = 1, neither of
them would ever be able to fulﬁll their contract. This is an example of overpromising.
Suppose next that both candidates are of the congruent type. Then no candidate will
deviate from a Nash equilibrium p1
i = p0





Suppose both candidates offer threshold contracts with p1
1 = p1
2 < 1 and p0
1 = p0
2 < 1.
Politicians face the trade-off between offering the largest thresholds that can be reached
by acting congruently and deviating from this offer to higher values, thereby increasing




⇔ R{[z+µ(1−z)](δ+δ2)−1} < G: (19)
We see that this condition will always be fulﬁlled if G is sufﬁciently large relative to R.27
B Appendix B: Political Information Market
In this Appendix we describe in detail the functioning of the political information market.
we ﬁrst describe the assets and the investors. As investors receive information from two
sources – the private signals and actions of politicians – we have to examine step by step
how both sources of information jointly determine the beliefs of the investors. Finally, we
determine the equilibrium price in the market.
B.1 Assets
We assume that a political information market is organized during the ﬁrst period after
politicians have chosen their actions.
There are two assets, D and E, in which investors can trade. If the politician is
reelected after the second period, the owners of asset D receive one monetary unit for a
single unit of D. If the politician stands for reelection but is not reelected after the second
27There exist other constellations where overpromising occurs. Details are available on request.
27period, the owners of asset E receive one monetary unit for a single unit of E. If the
politician is not able to run for second reelection, e.g. if he was already deselected at
the ﬁrst reelection or if he does not want to stand for reelection, then all transactions that
have occurred will be neutralized, i.e. each investor will be paid back the money he has
invested. 28
The information market works as follows: A bank or an issuer offers an equal amount
of assets D and E. On the secondary market, traders can buy assets D or E.29 Trading
in the secondary market results in price p for one unit of asset D. As buying one unit of
D and one unit of E pays one monetary unit with certainty, the price of asset E must be
1−p, otherwise either traders or the issuer could make riskless proﬁts. An equilibrium on
the information market is a price p∗ such that traders demand an equal amount of assets
D and E.30
It is useful to look more closely at the event tree associated with the assets. If, for
example, an investor buys one unit of asset D at price p, then the event tree and the payoffs
for the information market are given as:
Investor receives 1
Investor receives 0









successful at the second
  Investor buys one unit







In this paper we speciﬁcally design information markets to allow for the design of
reelection threshold contracts. If threshold contracts are offered, then the event tree and
the payoffs for the information market have to be modiﬁed in the following way:
28See Berg and Rietz (2003) for alternative ways to implement conditional prediction markets in practice.
29We could allow for short-selling, but this is immaterial to our analysis.
30This is equivalent to an information market with only asset D where traders can buy or sell D and an
equilibrium is obtained when supply equals demand.
28Investor buys one
unit of asset D at




in the threshold contract
Investor receives 1
Investor receives 0









successful at the second
price p
Investor receives p 
Investor receives p







larger than or equal to
Figure 4
Finally, note that with probability µ there is complete information in period 1. Then
the price in the information market will be either 1 or 0, depending on whether the politi-
cian undertook the socially optimal action or not.
B.2 Investors
There are N potential investors.31 Investors are a subgroup of voters. We assume that
there are many investors in the market. However, compared to the total number of voters
investors constitute a minority and can not inﬂuence the voting outcome.
We assume that investors have log utility with
Uj(Yj+Wj) = ln(Yj+Wj); (20)
whereWj is the investor’s wealth andYj is gain or loss in the information market.32 Each
investor j obtains a signal σj ∈{0;1} about the state of the world at the point in time when
the politician in ofﬁce discovers the state of the world.33 The probability that investor j
receives a correct signal, i.e. that σj = s1, is given by hj ∈ (1
2;1), where each investor j
knows his personal signal quality hj. Our assumption hj > 1
2 implies that the signals are
not completely uninformative.34 We assume that hj does not depend on the state that has
31It is sensible for only individuals to be allowed to trade in such information markets and for the trading
volume per person to be limited so as to avoid large-scale manipulation attempts.
32Note that we neglect utility from the action of the politician in the utility function of investors, as policy
outcomes have no inﬂuence on the trading behavior of investors.
33There are several justiﬁcations why investors may be better informed than voters. It is fair to assume
that investors spend time collecting information concerning the state of the world and thus have more
knowledge than ordinary voters.
34We could also allow for poor signal qualities, i.e. hj ∈ (0; 1
2). As investor j knows hj, a value of hj
near to 0 is as informative as a value near to 1. The lowest information gain is received by a signal which is
correct with a probability of 1
2. Nevertheless, we restrict the signal quality to hj ∈ (1
2;1) in order to avoid
additional case differentiations.
29occurred.35
We ﬁrst calculate the investors’ posterior probability estimations of the state after
they have received their signals. We obtain
















B.3 Information from the Politician’s Choice
Investors may receive additional information about the state by observing the action of the
incumbent. Recall that a politician of the congruent type will always behave congruently
in equilibrium when threshold contracts are used. The behavior of a dissonant incumbent
dependson the parameters R, G, δ, and µ, which are common knowledgeamong investors.
Three cases may occur: First, the value of G may be sufﬁciently low relative to R. Then
dissonant politicians will behave congruently. Second, the value of G is at an intermediate
level, and dissonant politicians will behave congruently in the popular state s1 = 1, while
they will behave dissonantly in the unpopular state s1 = 0. Third, the value of G may
be rather high relative to the beneﬁts from holding ofﬁce. Then dissonant politicians
will behave dissonantly in both states of the world. We summarize the three cases in the
following table, where ac
1 denotes the action of a congruent politician, while ad
1 denotes
the action of a dissonant politician.
Case Condition ac
1 if s1 = 1 ac
1 if s1 = 0 ad
1 if s1 = 1 ad
1 if s1 = 0
1 G ≤ µδR(1+δ) 1 0 1 0
µδR(1+δ)
2 < G 1 0 1 1
≤ δR(1+δ)
3 δR(1+δ) < G 1 0 0 1
Table 1
35The extension to state contingent values of hj does not change the qualitative results of our model.
30In the following we use c ∈ {1;2;3} to denote the cases. In the next step we calculate the
conditionalprobabilitiesProbc(s1 =1|a1 =1)andProbc(s1 =0|a1 = 0)foranindividual
investor without private signals updating his beliefs in the signalling game with politicians




for c = 2. We summarize the conditional probabilities in the following table:
Case Condition Probc(s1 = 1|a1 = 1) Probc(s1 = 0|a1 = 0)
1 G ≤ µδR(1+δ) 1 1




3 δR(1+δ) < G z 1−z
Table 2
B.4 Private Signals and Information from Politicians
Finally, we calculate the conditional probabilities Probc(s1|σj;a1) for c ∈ {1;2;3} when
voters have received their private signals σj and draw inferences from the signalling
games among politicians.
Case c = 1
Suppose c = 1. Then investors will learn the state with certainty by observing the action
of the incumbent and can disregard their signals σj. We obtain
Prob1(s1 = 1|σj = 1;a1 = 1) = Prob1(s1 = 1|σj = 0;a1 = 1) = 1;
Prob1(s1 = 1|σj = 1;a1 = 0) = Prob1(s1 = 1|σj = 0;a1 = 0) = 0;
Prob1(s1 = 0|σj = 1;a1 = 0) = Prob1(s1 = 0|σj = 0;a1 = 0) = 1;
Prob1(s1 = 0|σj = 1;a1 = 1) = Prob1(s1 = 0|σj = 0;a1 = 1) = 0:
Case c = 2
In case 2, investors know with certainty that the true state of the world is s1 =0 when they
observe a1 = 0, i.e.
Prob2(s1 = 1|σj = 1;a1 = 0) = Prob2(s1 = 1|σj = 0;a1 = 0) = 0;
Prob2(s1 = 0|σj = 1;a1 = 0) = Prob2(s1 = 0|σj = 0;a1 = 0) = 1:
31If investors observe a1 = 1, then the signalling game reveals that the probability of
s1 =1 after observing a1 =1 is equal to 2z
z+1. Using the additional information from signal
σj, investor j forms the following a posteriori belief:36










In a similar way we obtain












Case c = 3
In case 3, the investors do not gain any information from the politician’s action, as there
is complete pooling. A congruent politicians behaves congruently, while all dissonant
politicians behave dissonantly, and the probability for both types of politician equals 1
2.
Hence,
















B.5 Price Formation Process
For ease of exposition, we assume that all investors are homogeneous concerning the
quality of their signals σj, i.e. we assume that hj = h ∀j.37 Thus, investors only differ
36Alternatively, one could calculate the a posteriori belief of investor j in the following way:
Prob2(s1 = 1|σj = 1;a1 = 1) =
2Prob(s1 = 1|σj = 1)





Both methods lead to the same result.
37Further, we assume that investors are homogeneous concerning their wealth and their subjective conﬁ-
dence in their own signals. In Appendix C we will derive some general results for heterogeneous investors.
Using the notation of Appendix C we assumeWj =W ∀j and bj = b ∀j in this section. At the cost of addi-
tional notational complexity, the results can be extended to heterogeneous investors by using the formulas
derived in Appendix C.
32as to whether they receive signal σj = 1 or σj = 0. When the number of investors is
sufﬁciently large a fraction h of the investors will receive the correct signal, i.e. they
receive σj = 1 if s1 = 1 or σj = 0 if s1 = 0, respectively.38 A fraction 1−h will receive a
misleading signal, i.e. they receive σj = 1 if s1 = 0 or σj = 0 if s1 = 1.
From Corollary 3 in Appendix C we know that the price in the information market
will be a weighted average of the prices that would arise in the two subgroups of investors.
This means that the price will be h times the price that would arise in a market where all
investors receive a correct signal plus (1-h) times the price in a market where investors
only receive incorrect signals. Again, we go through all three cases.
Case c = 1
We start with case c=1. In this scenario, the action of the incumbent will perfectly reveal
the state of the world. Thus, we obtain
p∗1
1;1 = p∗1




0;1 = 0; (26)
where p∗c
a1;s1 denotes the equilibrium price in case c given action a1 and state s1. The
equilibrium price will equal one if the incumbent chooses the socially optimal action,
while the price will be zero if the politician chooses the non-optimal action.
Case c = 2
In case 2, we obtain
p∗2
0;0 = 1 (27)
and
p∗2
0;1 = 0; (28)
which reﬂects the fact that the equilibrium price will be equal to zero or one upon observ-
ing a1 =0, as this action reveals the true state of the world with certainty. If the incumbent












Case c = 3






38For a ﬁnite number of investors the variance of the fraction of investors receiving the correct signal is
not zero. However, for a sufﬁciently large number of investors the variance becomes arbitrarily small. For
instance, for N = 10000 the probability that the share of investors with a correct signal is in [0:89;0:91] for




















1;0. The next Proposition is the main
result of Appendix B.
Proposition 3 (detailed version)






























Proposition 3 shows that for h > ˆ h(z) the equilibrium price in all circumstances will
be larger than one-half if the incumbent behaves congruently, while the equilibrium price
will be smaller than one-half if the politician behaves dissonantly. Note that ˆ h(z) is in-
creasing in z for z ∈ (1




44;1) for z ∈ (1
2;1). The intuition that
ˆ h(z) must be larger than 1
2 runs as follows: The signal must be sufﬁciently informative
in order to detect dissonant behavior of a politician in the unpopular state s1 = 0 in case
c = 2, where Prob(s1 = 0|a1 = 1) is rather low. A formal derivation and explanation for
condition (35) is given in the following proof of Proposition 3:
Proof of Proposition 3
























After some manipulations we obtain the condition
2z(1−z)+h(1−h)(11z2−6z−1) > 0: (37)
34We note that h(1−h) < 1
4 ∀h ∈ (1
2;1) and that 2z(1−z) > −1
4(11z2−6z−1) ∀z ∈ (1
2;1).
Thus, condition (37) is always fulﬁlled.
Next we examine p∗2
1;0 < 1




















The next condition p∗3
1;1 > 1







This condition can be transformed to
z(1−z)+h(1−h)(4z2−2z−1) > 0: (42)
We note that h(1−h) < 1
4 ∀h ∈ (1
2;1) and that z(1−z) > −1
4(4z2−2z−1) ∀z ∈ (1
2;1).
Thus, condition (42) is always fulﬁlled.
The condition p∗3
1;0 < 1




















Condition (45) is a weaker condition than condition (40) as the following inequality holds















2 , then condition (45) will always be fulﬁlled.
Next we investigate p∗3
0;0 > 1






















This is identical to condition (41), which always holds as shown above.
B.6 Sophisticated Election Scheme
In this subsection we prove Proposition 8 by proving the following detailed version of
Proposition 8:
Proposition 8 (detailed version)
Suppose that h > ˆ ˆ h with














Then the equilibrium price in the information market fulﬁlls the following conditions:
p∗c
1;1 > z ∀c;
p∗c
0;0 > 1−z ∀c;
p∗c
1;0 < z ∀c
and
p∗c
0;1 < 1−z ∀c:
Proof of Proposition 8
The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3. First, it is obvious that
p∗1
1;1 > z, p∗1
0;0 > 1−z, p∗1
1;0 < z, p∗1
0;1 < 1−z, p∗2
0;0 > 1−z and p∗2
0;1 < 1−z.
We explore the condition p∗2




After some manipulations we obtain
2(1−z)2+h(1−h)(−9z2+16z−7) > 0: (51)
Using h(1−h) < 1
4 ∀h ∈ (1
2;1) and 2(1−z)2 > 1
4(9z2−16z+7) ∀z ∈ (1
2;1) shows that
condition (51) is fulﬁlled for all z ∈ {1
2;1}.
36Next we examine p∗2





















1;1 > z, p∗3
1;0 < z, p∗3
0;0 > 1−z and p∗3









As h ≥ 1
2 condition 56 is always fulﬁlled.
By comparing ˆ h and ˆ ˆ h we obtain the following Corollary:
Corollary 2
ˆ ˆ h < ˆ h for all z with 1
2 < z < 1.
Hence, for all values z∈(1
2;1) condition (49) is easier to fulﬁll than condition (35).39
As a consequence, SES, which uses the results from Proposition 8, is applicable for sig-
nals with lower information content than RES. Note that Corollary 2 follows directly from
comparing ˆ h and ˆ ˆ h. The claim ˆ ˆ h < ˆ h can be transformed to 2z2+z > 1, which proves the
Corollary.
C Appendix C: General Price Formation Process
In this Appendix we determine a general formula for an information market with hetero-
geneous agents. Suppose, without loss of generality, that politician 1 has been elected
after offering a contract C1(p1
1;p0
1), that the politician undertakes a1 = 1, and hence that
p1
1 applies.
For a price p < p1
1, no investor will have a strict incentive to buy assets, as he will be
paid back p. Suppose p ≥ p1
1. An investor j with signal σj has to weigh up the state of
39For z = 1
2 equation (35) would be identical to condition (49).
37his information and the information the market price will reveal.40 One way of modeling
the information aggregation process is as follows:
Probj(RE|p) = bj Probj(RE)+(1−bj) p; (57)
where Probj(RE|p) is the probability assessment of investor j that the incumbent will be
reelected, taking into account the information inferred from the market price. The term
Probj(RE) is given as the individual reelection probability estimation of an investor and
depends on his signal σj, the signal quality hj, the action a1, and the case c. If, e.g., c=3,
a1 = 1, and σj = 1, then Probj(RE) =
zhj
zhj+(1−z)(1−hj), where we assume that z and hj are
known to investor j. The weight bj (with 0 < bj ≤ 1) describes self-assessed conﬁdence,
i.e. the subjective conﬁdence of an investor in his estimation Probj(RE) relative to the
market belief expressed by the price p.41 The information aggregation formula (57) is
ﬂexible. It captures the case bj = 1 when investors rely only on their own signal, which
would occur if they can only submit a quantity (and not an entire demand/supply schedule
depending on the price) to the market. For small values of bj, investors rely mainly on the
information aggregated by the market.42
Given price p and signal Probj(RE), an investor j maximizes
max
dj
EUj = Probj(RE|p) ln(Wj+dj(1− p))+(1−Probj(RE|p)) ln(Wj−djp); (58)
where dj is the demand. If dj is positive, investor j will want to buy dj units of asset























40Note that investors learn nothing from the threshold contract offers of the candidates because in equi-
librium both types of politicians will offer the same contract, as we will show later.
41For a statistical foundation, see Morris (1983) and Rosenblueth and Ordaz (1992). Wolfers and Zitze-
witz (2006) have independently suggested a similar procedure.
42Note that it can never be rational to set bj = 0 ∀j as the price would contain no information contra-
dicting the assumption of investors to rely only on the information inferred from the market price. This is
the information paradox addressed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
38Proof of Proposition 9








Wj bj Probj(RE) − p
N ∑
j=1
Wj bj = 0. The assertion follows from that.
The market price is a wealth- and conﬁdence-weighted average belief on the part of
investors. We note that the market price is equal to the simple average belief of investors
if traders are homogeneous with respect to wealth and conﬁdence in their own belief. If
conﬁdence levels are homogeneous, the market price is a wealth-weighted average belief
on the part of traders. We summarize both cases in the following Corollary:
Corollary 3














D Appendix D: Welfare Gains
Here we provide an example of the welfare gains that can be achieved with the triple
mechanism. Suppose that, at a time when this institution is introduced, it is only known
that δ is equal to 1 and that µ is uniformly distributed in [0; 1
2]. Since only the proportion
of R and G is important for our analysis, we write G = αR with 0 ≤ α < ∞. In the
following, we calculate the values of µ that enable congruent behavior by the incumbent.
We use eo to denote the case with elections only and tm to denote the scenario with the
triple mechanism. From condition (6) we conclude that, in the case of elections alone, a
congruent politician will only behave congruently in state s1 = 1 if
αR+3R ≥ R:
This condition is equivalent to α ≥ −2. In the same way we obtain the other conditions
summarized in the following table:
39Congruent Politician Dissonant Politician
s1 = 1 s1 = 0 s1 = 1 s1 = 0
Elections Only α ≥ −2 µ ≥
1−α
3
α ≤ 2 µ ≥
1+α
3
Triple Mechanism α ≥ −2 µ ≥ −
α
2




Note that congruent politicians will always behave congruently in the scenario with
the triple mechanism, as conditions α ≥ −2 and µ ≥ −α
2 are always fulﬁlled. Further-
more, if α ≥ 1 congruent politicians will always behave congruently in the scenario with
elections only. Finally, it is apparent that a dissonant politician will never act congruently
for α > 2, which clearly derives from Corollary 1 and Proposition 6. In the next stage, we
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2dµ if α > 1
The reasoning for the above expression is as follows: A politician is of the congruent type
with probability 1
2. He always behaves congruently and thus generates a voter utility of
1. The probability that a politician is of the dissonant type and that state s1 = 1 occurs
is given by 1
2z. In this case, the politician generates a utility of 1 for all feasible values
of µ, as long as α is not larger than 2. Finally, the probability that a politician is of the
dissonant type and that state s1 = 0 occurs is given by 1
2(1−z). In this case, the politician
generates a utility of 1 for all values of µ with µ ≥ α
2, as long as α is not larger than 1.43
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2dµ if α > 1
2
43Note that we have assumed that µ is uniformly distributed in [0; 1
2].







2[1−α(1−z)] if α ≤ 1
1
2 + 1
2z if 1 < α ≤ 2
1
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2 < α ≤ 1
1
2 + 1
2z if 1 < α ≤ 2
1
2 if α > 2:
(62)
We illustrate the relationships by calculating the utilities for four different values of
α. We choose one value of α that is smaller than 1, one value larger than 1, and α equal to
1. These values correspond to the cases where, for the politician, utility G is lower/higher
than or equal to utility R. Furthermore, we add the special case α=0, where the politician
has no private beneﬁts G. The expected utilities in these four cases are summarized in the
following table:





























Note that in all cases we have EUtm ≥ EUeo. Further, we see that EUtm is strictly larger
than EUeo if z < 1 and α < 1. The difference between EUtm and EUeo depends on z
for 0 < α < 1. The last row in the table shows the relative welfare gains (∆EU). ∆EU is
maximum for α = 0. The example illustrates the following insights:
(i) Threshold contracts have the highest effect in the case α = 0, i.e. if the politicians
are only motivated by beneﬁts R acquired from holding ofﬁce. Note that threshold
41contracts may reduce the reelection chances of the incumbent. Thus, threshold con-
tracts will be more effective if politicians are mainly interested in getting reelected,
which is expressed in a low value of α.
(ii) If α is at least equal to 1, i.e. if politicians are at least as motivated by G as by R,
then there is no effect from threshold contracts. This is due to the fact that in state
s1 =0 congruent politicians always behave congruently, while dissonant candidates
always behave dissonantly. The conditions for congruent behavior in state s1 = 1
are the same in the scenarios with or without threshold contracts.
If α is at least equal to 2, then congruent politicians will always behave congruently,
while dissonant candidates will always behave dissonantly. Thus, the expected util-
ity is equal to 1
2.
(iii) Finally, for a given value of α we discover that ∆EU is (weakly) increasing when z
decreases. Thus, the higher the probability of the unpopular state s1 = 0, the larger
is the effect of threshold contracts.
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